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BOOK REVIEW:
LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTH
COMPARATIVE
AND
A
CONTEXTUAL
CARE:
PERSPECTIVE
Authored by: Keith Syrett*
Keith Syrett argues for a reappraisal of the role played by public law
adjudication in questions of healthcare rationing. As governments
worldwide turn to strategies of explicit rationing to manage the
disparity between the demand for and supply of health services and
treatments, disappointed patients and the public have sought to contest
the moral authority of organizations making these rationing decisions.
This has led to the growing involvement of law in this field of public
policy. The author argues that, rather than bemoaning this
development, those working within the health policy community
should recognize the points of confluence between the principles and
purposes of public law and the proposals which have been made to
address rationing's 'legitimacy problem'. Drawing upon jurisprudence
from England, Canada and South Africa, the book evaluates the
capacity of courts to establish the conditions for a process of public
deliberation from which legitimacy for healthcare rationing may be
derived.
HOW THE LAW SHOULD HELP RATION HEALTH CARE
Reviewed by: JonathanRohde**
INTRODUCTION
Law, Legitimacy, and the Rationing of Health Care opens by setting an
alarming scene. The cost of public health care continues to rise, the
need for healthcare resources continues to grow, and governments are
continuously forced to make hard decisions about the distribution of
Dr. Keith Syrett is a Solicitor and Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of
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their limited resources. In his book, Keith Syrett examines these
problems, examines potential public policy approaches, and presents
the compelling argument that an increased role of public law lends
legitimacy to these controversial decisions.' Syrett points out the
undeniable trend in public healthcare systems in favor of explicit
decision making rather than implicit decision making. The increasing
demand for explicitness is necessitated by the scarcity of health
resources and the inevitable rationing of these resources. Social
instability, he posits, is likely to occur when the public is not satisfied
with the process or outcome of the rationing. The scope of the book is
the interaction of public law with allocative decision-making in the
healthcare context.
Syrett employs an intriguing, measured, and meticulous
approach to the argument that public law should play a role in health
resource rationing. The ethical and theoretical constructions concerning
public healthcare policies are comprehensively analyzed and are made
accessible to even legal novice. For the American reader, the three
areas of jurisprudence from which Syrett draws his comparative
analysis (England, Canada, and South Africa) will initially seem
unfamiliar. However, Syrett does a commendable job in making them
accessible to those of us with minimal experience in foreign
jurisprudence. Ultimately the fundamental legal issues encountered by
public law in Law, Legitimacy, and the Rationing of Health Care
provide the most familiar grounds for an American reader. All three
legal systems share certain fundamental considerations, such as judicial
restraint vs. judicial activism, the propriety of the court usurping the
role of the legislature, constitutional and statutory interpretation, and
the appropriate role of human rights.
DESCRIPTION
The first two sections of the book are less an assertion that an actual
problem exists and more of an attempt at defining the scope of the
problem itself. Syrett begins by teasing out the factors that lead to the
need to ration healthcare resources.
After considering multiple
meanings of "rationing," he settles the following definition by
Maynard: "rationing takes place when an individual is deprived of care
which is of benefit (in terms of improving health status, or the length
'Keith Syrett,

LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTHCARE, page cited
(Margaret Brazier & Graeme Laurie eds., Cambridge University Press 2007).
2 Id. at

11.
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and quality of life) and which is desired by the patient." 3 He concludes
that even after considering alternatives like "reduction of waste" and
"elimination of ineffective treatments," rationing of resources will still
be neccessary.4
So rationing, according to Syrett's analysis, is inevitable. The
author then examines the ways rationing has been attempted thus far,
including rationing by price, by denial, by selection, by delay, by
deterrence, by deflection, and by dilution.5 Syrett provides a brief
description of these various methods, and also notes that these types of
rationing are often at work simultaneously within a healthcare system,
"[I]t should be noted that rationing in any given healthcare episode is
likely to involve a complex interaction between, and combination of,
these techniques, and6 that these will be deployed at various points by
health professionals.",
This brings Syrett to a pillar of his thesis: rationing should be
carried out in an explicit manner. Explicit rationing "makes transparent
the fact that such decisions rest upon resource constraints ' '7, as opposed
to implicit rationing that "eschews the transparent deployment of rules
or principles which define the bass upon which distribution takes place
.", and the "allocative character of the decision is generally
camouflaged beneath clinical judgments." 8 He then takes a sampling of
explicit rationing attempts, including the experiences of England9 and
of the Oregon' ° legislature. Syrett notes that while explicit rationing
can "enable more comprehensive centralized control to be exerted over
health expenditure", it is also problematic in that there is "[g]reater
instability, reduced scope for 'blame avoidance', and difficulty in
achieving consensus upon underlying substantive principles to guide
allocation decisions . . . . I However, while there has been a reaction
to some of these negative aspects Syrett contends that once healthcare

3 Id. at 19 (citing A. Maynard, Rationing Health Care: an Exploration, 49 HEALTH

POLICY 5, 6 (1999).
4 Syrett, supra at 44.
5 Syrett, supra note 1, at 45-48.
6Id. at49.
7Id. at 54
8 Id. at 53.
9
1d. at 117.
'0 Id. (discussing the Oregon Health Services Commission, which sought to establish
a package of publicly-funded medical treatments and services in the 1990s).
" Id. at 73.
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rationing is revealed to the public, governments cannot revert to an
implicit system. 12
In other words, the public is unable to 'unknow' that rationing of
healthcare resources occurs. Syrett then takes on the issues of who
should be in charge of rationing, and what gives that group that right.
In order to determine who may legitimately make explicit
rationing decisions with health care resources, Syrett gives an "account
of the state of current thinking and practice on how to address a
significant policy problem which has emerged in modern health
systems."' 13 He notes that when explicit rationing decisions are made,
the question of the legitimate moral authority of those responsible often
causes social instability. 14 This potential volatility has lead decisionmakers to take refuge in a 'procedural approach', and assert legitimacy
through the 'norms of procedural justice'.15 Syrett cites the example of
NICE in the UK which has publicly declared its commitment to the
"accountability for reasonableness" model. 16 With the understanding
that a largely procedurally dependent approach is being adopted, Syrett
then analyzes what role the law has in this environment. 17
First, Syrett sets out the ethical "accountability for
reasonableness" framework. This framework focuses on the need for
the administrative body to provide reasons for their decisions, the need
for the administrative body to engage in scrutiny of the relevant
conditions surrounding the decisions, and the need for an
administrative body to have an internal structure for dispute resolutions
including and appeals process to allow for revisions and improvement.
Syrett then compares "accountability for reasonableness" principles to

12

Id. at 74 ("[N]ow that the existence of healthcare rationing has been exposed to

public view, as has been the effect of the strategies described here, there is no
prospect of a wholesale return to the relative stability of the status quo ante of
'concealed' rationing choices, even on the assumption that the medical profession
would be prepared to reassume the burden of primary responsibility of allocation of
scare resources").
13Id. at 119 (emphasis in original).
14 Id
15 Id.
16

Id. at 119 ("This is most evident from the experience of NICE in the UK, which, in

addition to its role in gathering and assessing evidence of the clinical and costeffectiveness of new medical technologies, has publicly avowed its commitment to
the 'accountability for reasonableness' model and which, through its Citizens'
Council, has sought to integrate deliberative democracy into its decision-making,
albeit within limited parameters and with questionable success").
17Id
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very congruent elements of public law, and contends that public law
provides a vehicle for this ethical foundation.
The author then examines the contention by some ethicists that
judicial intervention and the specter of litigation should not be involved
in health care resource rationing. Syrett attacks the assumption that
judicial intervention in the arena of rationing health care resources is
undesirable. He argues that exhausting the internal processes of the
institution charged with explicit distribution will minimize legal
"interference" and the costly burdens of litigation. Through detailed
analysis he points out that the "strong correspondence between public
law and legitimation would point to the utility of adjudication as a
means of responding to the 'legitimacy problem'..." 18
Syrett asserts that courts can serve to key functions in public
law and in the distribution of health care resources: "[f]irst, a court case
can serve a catalytic purpose, providing information and feeding into a
public discussion on the acceptability of health care rationing . . .,,19
"Secondly, the courtroom itself may be seen as a deliberative arena,
enabling an exchange of reasoned argumentation to occur between
.,,20 This kind of deliberation will
parties and the judge(s) ...
"[c]ontribute to the ultimate objective of encouraging wide deliberation
21
within political and civil society upon issues of healthcare rationing."
After establishing a theoretical justification for public law
application in decisions of explicit rationing of healthcare resources
Syrett turns to how this has worked in practice. He examines the
jurisprudence of three countries- England, Canada, and South Africa.
English courts, in the absence of recognized human rights provisions
concerning the distribution of public health resources, have been
reticent to realize a role in the legitimacy problem. The English courts
view the distribution as purely "political." They are deferential to the
determinations made by the NHS, and have not required the NHS to
further than the "mere
explain how it arrived at its set of priorities
22
resources.",,
tight
of
bell
the
of
'tolling
In Canada the courts have been more strict in their scrutiny of
limited healthcare resource cases. This partially stems from an indirect
right to healthcare attenuated through the Charter of Rights and
18

Id. at 157. The legitimacy problem consists of identifying how a political order's

worthiness is to be recognized. See pages 136-142 for further discussion.
9
2' 01d. at 158

1d.

21 Id.
22

Id. at 177.
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Freedoms. 23 However, the application of the Charter in the Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General)case to the rationing of healthcare resources
produced some hotly contested results. The Supreme Court of Canada
split 3:3 in its decision as to whether a violation of section 7 had
occurred.24 This has increased "the fear that judges may substitute their
own views in place of the original decision-maker, rather than
restricting their role to enforcing observance on the part of the decisionmaker of procedural conditions ...,, Syrett suggests that this nearactivism toes the line between what is a proper and constitutionally
supported26 judicial function and what would is improper judicial
activism.
South African jurisprudence provides the strongest support for
Syrett's contention that courts can lend stabilizing legitimacy to
instability created by the rationing of health resources. South Africa
does have an explicit right to access of healthcare in its constitution. 27
Additionally South Africa has a "constitutional culture of justification"
that is a remnant from its recent history. There is a strong need for
government action to have both justification and transparency. In the
TAC case the court ruled on a restrictive government policy regarding
the treatment of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The court
indicated that the current policy, and the government's subsequent
attempt to rationalize it, were lacking. The court applied a
"reasonableness test" which, while abstract and open-ended, consisted
of inquires into the "[c]oherence, even-handedness, flexibility,
inclusiveness, and feasibility of the policy.', 28 It declared the policy
unconstitutional and ordered several mandatory policies. However, the
court included "that the government would be permitted to adapt its
policy in a manner consistent with the Constitution if equally
appropriate or better measures for •the,,29prevention of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV became available.
Syrett approves of the South
23

See Id.at 181, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms - specifically in section 7 (right

to life, liberty, and security of the person) and section 15 (the right to equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination on certain enumerated grounds
(such
as sex, age or mental or physical disability) or analogous grounds).
24
Id. at 186.
25 Id. at 206.
26 Id.

Id. at 207 (section 27 provides in pertinent part "Everyone has the right to have
access to healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare ...No one may be
refused emergency medical treatment.")
27

28

29

Id.at 219.
Id.at 216.
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African court's approach, saying that "[i]t commendably sought to steer
a middle course between the largely deferential and non-interventionist
stance adopted by the English judiciary, which admits of little
deliberation on question of the distribution of healthcare resources, and
the activist approach evident
in Chaoulli, which was widely regarded as
30
constitutionally improper."
Syrett then uses elements of the South African approach to
construct his "modest proposal." He asserts that it is vital when
adjudicating an alleged violation of the right that "a court [be] obligated
to require that a reasoned explanation of the rationing choice presented,
in order to ascertain whether the balance which has been struck
between individual and community interests can be justified with
reference to plausible reasons." 31 This type of moderate intervention is
a tool that increases the amount of deliberation between political and
social groups. Intervention of public law also requires the
rationalization behind the allocative decisions to become transparent to
the public, and requires that the decision-maker offer evidenced and
reasoned justification for such decisions. 32 This type of transparency
may enhance public education concerning such decisions, and helps
foster a culture of justification that demands deliberation on rationing.
EVALUATION
Keith Syrett employs an organized and meticulous approach to the
questions present in Law, Legitimacy, and the Rationing of Health
Care. He uses both contextual (examining the current policies and
theories in public health law) and comparative analysis (examining the
treatment of the scarcity of health resources issue across three
countries' jurisprudence) to construct his conclusions.
The contextual analysis is comprehensive. Syrett lays out the
pertinent policy or theory, explains its benefits, explains its actual or
potential short comings, and then applies it to policies or theories that
support his thesis. This well-reasoned analysis provides a
comprehensive overview of the subject, which proves to be crucial for
those is unfamiliar with this type of material.
The author's comparative analysis is well organized and subtly
encourages the reader to support Syrett's conclusions. Syrett primes the
reader with the English courts' reluctance to engage in the area of
3 Id. at
3 1Id. at
32 Id. at

229.
237.
233.
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public health rationing decisions. He then removes this resistance and
replaces the feeling of total inaction by revving the engine of judicial
activism by the Supreme Court of Canada. After the reader is frustrated
with doldrums of deference, and then alarmed by the acceleration of
activism, Syrett presents what he considers an appropriate pace: the
"reasonableness test" of the South African Court. The presentation of
two extremes (or potential extremes) serves as an excellent device to
silently show that the moderate approach does not suffer from
drawbacks of the extreme ones.
Syrett sets out his thesis to deal with the legitimacy problem
that has persisted with respect to the explicit rationing of limited
healthcare resources. "[T]hose concerned with resolving the
'legitimacy problem' to which the rationing of healthcare gives rise
should reassess the contribution which may be made by the courts in
this area of public policy." 33 He amply illustrates, through his initial
case study concerning the rationing of Herceptin in England, that there
is a problem. that the problem is serious, and that it will only worsen
with time.
His argument for greater legal involvement in this are of public
policy is eloquently articulated. Syrett points out, to those that have
argued against the courts becoming involved in the rationing of health
resources, the festering harmonies present in public law principles and
the public policy ethics of "accountability for reasonableness." After
showing that there is little basis for such ethical objections, he then
does a decent job of quelling most the additional fears associated with
the presence of the law on the field of public policy.
The greatest obstacle to his argument is the 'near-hit'
occurrence of judicial activism in Canada. He does not ignore this
potential roadblock. He instead uses it to clarify the parameters of his
position that the law should assume a facilitative role, rather than a
substantive one when dealing with limited health resource allocation
He also uses the near-activism to emphasize the
decisions.
effectiveness of adjudication in generating open and pluralistic
deliberation within a society, which are both ethical desirables in the
field of public policy.
The book is written, admittedly, from a British perspective.
One cannot ignore the author's implicit concern with the lack of
judicial action by the English courts. Syrett is clearly in favor of public
law involvement in the area of health resource rationing (it is a large
"31d. at 10.
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part of his book), and certainly opposed to the English court's
reticence. Syrett recognizes the lack of explicit power given to the
English courts in this manner, and that "any shift in judicial attitudes is
likely only to come about in response to developments in public policy
elsewhere, especially to a lead taken by government. 34 The English
courts see their role as primarily reactive, and Syrett concludes that
"[t]heir capacity to facilitate the attainment of legitimacy through the
health system as a whole remains inhibited by such an outlook." 3 After
reviewing the other two areas of jurisprudence Syrett emphatically
states that "scrutiny which is restrained and deferential to the degree
that no obligation of justification at all is imposed upon allocative
decision-makers amounts to an abdication of the essential democratic
function of the judiciary: ... to secure legal responsibility for decisions
36

which... amount to unlawful exercises of administrative power."
Overall, Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Health Care is
successful in advocating that public law should to operate in both a
practical and a theoretical arena. Syrett is an organized writer who has
skillfully arranged his material for maximum impact. While the more
theoretical arguments are essential, the practical applications prove to
be more compelling. After reading through the entire book, though, this
reader felt like his treatment of the cases in Canada and South Africa
could have been more detailed. I was immediately drawn to the
Herceptin case study by the way Syrett set up the story, the medicine,
and the involvement of the media. I would have liked to see a similar
approach taken in the TAC (South Africa) and Caoulli (Canada) cases
by adding them to the introduction of the book. By failing to include
these anecdotes, the author may have missed an opportunity to lay a
foundation concerning the cultural, legal, and societal considerations
that come into play in South Africa as opposed to England and Canada.
It was of great benefit, when reading the analysis of the British
jurisprudence, to have a kind of "background" already in place, as our
American common law tradition was inherited from the British. When
the discussion moved to Canada and South Africa, many readers will
be left with no foundation from which to build.
I would recommend this book as a thoughtful and
comprehensive overview of the policy, theory, and practice of law
concerning health resource rationing decisions. Sryett is a very
organized writer, and does an excellent job of promoting his position
34

Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).

35

Id.

31

Id. at 243.

342
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through considering both its strengths and shortcoming. His book
provides an interesting window into other treatments of human rights
claims and a comparative presentation of other nations' approaches for
those who are focused in the area of public or constitutional law. It also
presents a useful typology of resource rationing and broadly considers
the issues that politicians and providers face when determining how to
present the rationing choices for those interested in public health law.
Finally, the book presents a balanced consideration of benefits and
drawbacks of judicial deference and of judicial activism. I recommend
it to anyone that has a strong interest in health care policy, and in what
type of role the law should play in determining health care priorities.

